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On	28	September	2015,	the	northern	Afghan	city	of	Kunduz	fell	to	the	Taliban.	Some	
5,000	Afghan	soldiers,	police	and	militia	were	protecting	Kunduz,	but	these	quickly	
retreated	as	hundreds	of	Taliban	swept	into	the	city	to	join	up	with	insurgents	who	
had	infiltrated	beforehand.	This	was	a	hard	won	victory	for	the	Taliban.	Pouring	
fighters	into	the	north,	they	had	by	degrees	taken	increasingly	control	of	the	districts	
around	Kunduz	city	over	the	past	two	years,	even	compromising	on	their	usual	
austere	rule	in	order	win	over	local	support.
2
	The	Afghan	government	vowed	to	
quickly	retake	Kunduz,	but	the	army	had	to	fight	through	Taliban	held	territory	
                                                
1
	 This	is	an	Accepted	Manuscript	of	an	article	published	by	Taylor	and	Francis	in	Survival	on	25	
November	2015,	available	online	at	
http://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116157	
2	
	Joseph	Goldstein,	‘A	Taliban	Prize,	Won	in	a	Few	Hours	After	Years	of	Strategy,’	New	York	Times,	
30	September	2015.		
 2 
surrounding	the	city.
3
	Supported	by	US	airstrikes	and	special	forces,	Afghan	
commandos	began	to	clear	the	Taliban	out	of	the	city	on	1	October.
4
	It	took	two	
weeks	to	achieve	this.
5	
In	seizing	Kundaz,	the	Taliban	achieved	a	key	stated	objective	of	their	2015	
campaign,	which	was	to	capture	a	provincial	capital.	Appearing	before	the	Senate	
Armed	Services	Committee	a	few	days	afterwards,	the	commander	of	coalition	
forces,	General	John	Campbell,	‘absolutely’	agreed	with	Senator	John	McCain	when	
he	observed	that	‘from	a	PR	standpoint,	it	was	a	rather	significant	victory	for	the	
Taliban.’
6
	But	however	significant	or	spectacular	it	was,	this	victory	does	not	alter	the	
strategic	reality	of	the	war,	which	is	one	of	stalemate.	As	we	show	below,	neither	
side	can	win	militarily.	The	Afghan	army	and	police	have	no	hope	of	wiping	out	the	
insurgency.	Equally,	the	Taliban	cannot	win	back	Afghanistan	through	force	of	arms	
alone.		
This	creates	a	simple	and	compelling	logic	for	peace	talks	as	the	only	way	to	
end	the	conflict.	The	past	decade	has	seen	a	number	of	initiatives	by	the	Afghan	
government	to	reach	out	to	the	Taliban.	Most	were	designed	to	co-opt	Taliban	
commanders	or	persuade	Taliban	fighters	to	abandon	their	military	campaign,	rather	
                                                
3	
	Alissa	J.	Rubin,	‘Afghan	Forces	Rally	in	Kunduz,	But	Fight	is	Far	from	Decided,’	New	York	Times,	1	
October	2015;	Rod	Norland	and	Jawad	Sukhanyar,	‘Taliban	and	Afghan	Government	Dispute	Status	of	
Kunduz,	New	York	Times,	21	June	2015.	
4	
	Margherita	Stancati	and	Habib	Khan	Totakhil,	‘Afghan	Forces	Recapture	Central	Kunduz	from	
Taliban,’	Wall	Street	Journal,	1	October	2015,	http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-forces-recapture-
kunduz-from-the-taliban-1443678671		
5
	 Sayed	Salahuddin,	‘Taliban	Annouce	Pullout	from	Kunduz,’	Washington	Post,	13	October	2015,	
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taliban-say-they-are-pulling-out-of-
kunduz/2015/10/13/9f395af2-71cc-11e5-ba14-318f8e87a2fc_story.html		
6	
	General	John	Campbell,	Commander	of	US	Forces-Afghanistan,	testimony	on	US	Military	
Operations	in	Afghanistan	before	the	Senate	Armed	Services	Committee,	6	October	2015,	
http://www.c-span.org/video/?328585-1/general-john-campbell-testimony-us-military-operations-
afghanistan		
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than	coherent	and	genuine	attempts	to	negotiate	peace.
7
	For	their	part,	the	Taliban	
have	focused	since	2006	on	sustaining	their	military	campaign	in	the	face	of	growing	
western	intervention.	Nonetheless,	the	past	five	years	have	seen	a	discernible	shift	
in	Taliban	strategy	from	one	focused	solely	on	fighting	to	include	a	diplomatic	track.	
Thus	the	Taliban	agreed	to	open	a	political	office	in	Qatar,	participated	in	occasional	
track-two	events,	engaged	with	a	handful	of	governments,	and	participated	in	a	
sustained	humanitarian	dialogue.
8
	However,	progress	on	peace	talks	was	stymied	by	
the	Taliban	refusal	to	negotiate	with	Afghan	President	Hamid	Karzai,	whose	intent	
they	distrusted,	and	who	they	considered	a	mere	‘puppet	of	the	Americans.’
9
	The	
election	of	Ashraf	Ghani	as	Afghan	President	in	September	2014	has	provided	the	
opportunity	to	push	forward	with	peace	talks.	At	a	time	when	many	Taliban	might	be	
mistaken	about	the	possibility	of	military	victory,	this	article	examines	what	can	be	
done	to	bring	the	Taliban	to	the	negotiating	table	and	to	keep	them	there.		
Our	study	builds	on	numerous	face-to-face	discussions	and	commissioned	
interviews	with	senior	Taliban	figures,	and	for	Semple,	many	years	of	studying	the	
Taliban.	We	situate	our	analysis	in	the	context	of	Taliban	political	culture,	which	
presents	a	potential	barrier	to	reconciliation.	Our	research	also	reveals	a	more	
pragmatic	strain	in	Taliban	thinking	which	is	more	open	to	peace	talks.
10
	We	
approach	our	analytical	task	respectful	of	the	challenge	of	understanding	decision-
                                                
7	
	For	a	critical	review	of	these	early	attempts	to	make	deals	with	the	Taliban,	see	Michael	Semple,	
Reconciliation	in	Afghanistan	(Washington,	DC:	United	States	Institute	for	Peace,	2009).	
8
		 This	sequence	of	initiatives	is	described	in	detail	in	Michael	Semple,	‘Peace	Dialogue:	the	Afghan	
Case,	2001-2014,’	in	Pernille	Rieker	and	Henrik	Thune,	Dialogue	and	Conflict	Resolution:	Potential	and	
Limits	(Surrey:	Ashgate,	2015),	pp.	143-166.	
9	
	This	point	was	made	clearly	by	four	senior	Taliban	figures	we	interviewed	individually	over	several	
hours	in	the	Gulf	in	July	2012.	
10	
	For	previous	discussion	on	this,	see	Michael	Semple,	Theo	Farrell,	Anatol	Lieven	and	Rudra	
Chaudhuri,	Taliban	Perspectives	on	Reconciliation,	Royal	United	Services	Institute,	September	2012,	
https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Taliban_Perspectives_on_Reconciliation.pdf		
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making	in	what	is	an	opaque	organization	operating	in	the	context	of	a	very	complex	
and	seemingly	interminable	conflict.	We	are	also	mindful	of	the	inherent	chanciness	
of	war,	where	luck	may	favour	one	side	and	unforeseen	events	can	have	large	
consequences	–	the	fall	of	Kunduz	being	a	possible	example.
11
	Given	uncertainty	
surrounding	Taliban	decision-making	and	the	fickle	hand	of	fate,	pursuing	on	any	
single	line	of	action	to	bring	about	an	end	to	the	conflict,	including	an	attempt	
through	a	single	negotiating	channel	to	achieve	a	‘grand	bargain,’	faces	a	high	risk	of	
failure.	Indeed,	this	was	demonstrated	when	the	United	States	focused	all	its	
energies	on	negotiating	with	the	Taliban	office	in	Qatar	in	2013,	only	to	see	the	talks	
abandoned	before	they	even	got	off	the	ground.
12
	Therefore,	we	propose	a	portfolio	
of	actions	designed	to	persuade	the	Taliban	towards	ending	the	armed	campaign,	
and	to	develop	the	opportunities	for	talks	take	place.	
	
	
Military	Stalemate	
The	current	war	in	Afghanistan	re-started	in	earnest	when	the	Taliban	infiltrated	
back	into	the	country	in	increasing	numbers	in	2005-06,	just	as	North	Atlantic	Treaty	
Organization	(NATO)	was	deploying	forces	into	the	Pashtun	heartlands	of	southern	
and	eastern	Afghanistan	under	the	International	Security	Assistance	Force	(ISAF)	
mission.	As	we	show	below,	ISAF	tried	to	inflict	a	strategic	defeat	on	the	Taliban,	and	
failed.	Since	December	2014	when	the	ISAF	mission	ended,	responsibility	for	
                                                
11	
	As	the	great	theorist	of	war,	Carl	von	Clausewitz	observed:	‘There	is	no	human	affair	that	stands	
so	constantly	and	so	generally	in	close	connexion	with	chance	as	War.’	Carl	von	Clausewitz,	On	War,	
edited	by	Anatol	Rapoport	(London:	Penguin,	1968),	p.	116.	
12	
	Farrell	discussions	with	senior	US	officials,	Washington	DC,	February	2013;	Matthew	Rosenberg	
and	Alisia	J.	Rubin,	‘Taliban	Step	Toward	Afghan	Peace	Talks	is	Hailed	by	US,’	New	York	Times,	18	June	
2013;	Dan	Roberts	and	Emma	Graham-Harrison,	‘US-Taliban	Afghanistan	Peace	Talks	in	Qatar	
Cancelled,	Guardian	20	June	2013.	
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defeating	the	Taliban	has	fallen	entirely	on	Afghan	shoulders.	NATO	continues	to	
provide	material	support	to	the	Afghan	security	forces	under	its	train,	advice	and	
assist	(TTA)	Resolute	Support	mission,	as	well	as	air	support	as	required	for	Afghan	
operations,	but	the	Alliance	no	longer	has	combat	forces	in	the	field.	The	Taliban	
have	been	suitably	emboldened,	declaring	at	the	onset	of	their	spring	campaign	this	
year	that	it	aimed	for	‘the	complete	liberation	of	our	beloved	homeland.’
13	
	
The	big	showdown	
In	the	spring	of	2009,	President	Obama	appointed	a	new	ISAF	commander,	General	
Stanley	McChrystal,	to	turn	around	a	failing	war.	He	also	approved	a	military	surge	
that	would	see	US	forces	in	Afghanistan	eventually	rise	from	34,000	when	he	took	
office	to	98,000	by	mid	2010.	The	bulk	of	these	additional	forces	went	to	the	south,	
where	McChrystal	had	determined	ISAF	was	most	at	risk	of	losing	the	war.
	14
	
McChrystal	was	under	immense	pressure	to	produce	quick	results	–	inside	a	year	or	
two.	Thus,	he	looked	for	somewhere	to	inflict	a	‘strategic	defeat’	on	the	Taliban,	and	
thereby	accelerate	progress	in	the	ISAF	campaign.	That	place	was	Helmand,	where	
the	2nd	Marine	Expeditionary	Brigade	(2	MEB)	had	deployed	as	the	first	of	the	US	
surge	forces,	and	the	most	powerful	European	force	was	based,	the	British-led	Task	
Force	Helmand	(TFH).
15
	By	the	time	McChrystal	arrived,	the	2	MEB	was	already	
                                                
13	
	Robin	Pagnameta	and	Eltaf	Asefy,	‘Taliban	Poised	to	Take	40%	of	Afghanistan,’	The	Times,	23	April	
2015,	http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4419478.ece		
14	
	Thus,	in	February	2010,	there	were	54,500	troops	in	ISAF	Regional	Command-South,	and	44,500	
in	the	rest	of	Afghanistan.	See	Rudra	Chaudhuri	and	Theo	Farrell,	‘Campaign	Disconnect:	Operational	
Progress	and	Strategic	Obstacles,	2009-2011,’	International	Affairs,	vol.	87,	n.	2,	March	2011,	p.	281.		
15	
	Farrell	discussions	with	ISAF	officers,	ISAF	Headquarters,	9-13	January	2010.	
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driving	the	Taliban	out	of	Nawa	and	Garsmir	districts	in	southern	Helmand.	He	
sought	to	capitalize	on	this	momentum	with	a	major	offensive	in	central	Helmand.
16
		
Launched	in	February	2010,	Operation	Moshtarak,	saw	US	Marine	forces	
push	into	Taliban	controlled	Marjah	district,	and	TFH	eject	the	Taliban	out	of	
strongholds	in	the	northern	edge	of	Nad-e	Ali	district.	In	the	largest	air	assault	of	the	
war,	some	1,600	American,	British	and	Afghan	troops	were	lifted	in	waves	of	
helicopters	directly	into	Taliban	held	villages	in	Marjah	and	Nad-e	Ali.	Taliban	
defenses	rapidly	collapsed.	The	British	were	able	to	extend	Afghan	government	into	
northern	Nad-e	Ali	but	the	US	Marines	struggled	to	do	likewise	in	Marjah.
17
	The	
failure	to	make	progress	in	Marjah	was	a	major	embarrassment	to	McChrystal,	who	
in	the	days	leading	up	to	Operation	Moshtarak	had	told	the	world’s	media	‘We’ve	
got	government	in	a	box,	ready	to	roll	in.’
18
	By	May	2010,	an	utterly	exasperated	
McChrystal	said	of	Marjah	‘this	is	a	bleeding	ulcer	right	now.’
19	
	Military	pressure	on	the	Taliban	increased	when	General	David	Petraeus	
assumed	command	of	ISAF	in	June	2010,	with	a	major	offensive	against	Taliban	
strongholds	in	Kandahar	province	and	intensification	of	the	‘kill	or	capture’	campaign	
by	US	and	ISAF	special	operations	forces.	Where	McChrystal	had	emphasized	
‘courageous	restraint’	by	ISAF	forces,	to	minimize	the	impact	of	military	operations	
on	the	civilian	population,	Petraeus	emphasized	that	ISAF	forces	would	engage	in	
‘relentless	pursuit’	of	the	Taliban.	According	to	ISAF	figures	around	2,900	Taliban	
                                                
16	
	Observations	and	briefings	from	Farrell	visits	to	Lashkar	Gah	and	Garmsir,	Helmand,	October	
2009.	
17	
	For	an	assessment	of	Operation	Mosharak	based	on	extensive	field	research,	see	Theo	Farrell,	
Appraising	Moshtarak:	The	Campaign	for	Nad-e	Ali	District,	Helmand,	RUSI	Briefing	Note,	June	2010,	
13pp,	https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Appraising_Moshtarak.pdf		
18	
	Dexter	Filkins,	‘Afghan	Offensive	is	New	War	Model,’	New	York	Times,	13	February	2010.	
19	
	Dion	Nissenbaum,	‘McChrystal	Calls	Marjah	a	‘Bleeding	Ulcer’	in	Afghanistan	Campaign,’	
McClatchy	Newspapers,	24	May	2010.		
 7 
were	killed	or	captured	by	American	and	ISAF	special	operations	forces	from	July	to	
September	2010,	including	some	285	Taliban	commanders,	with	most	from	Helmand	
and	Kandahar.
20
		
Under	McChrystal	and	Petraeus,	widely	recognized	as	the	two	greatest	
American	war	commanders	of	recent	times,	NATO	will	and	resources	were	
concentrated	as	never	before	on	defeating	the	Taliban	in	the	south.	Yet	ISAF	failed	to	
deliver	the	killer	blow.	Instead,	the	Taliban	were	dislodged	from	central	Helmand	for	
a	time,	with	many	fighters	displaced	to	the	northern	districts.	This	created	problems	
for	ISAF	forces	elsewhere	in	the	province,	most	especially	in	Sangin.	In	the	winter	of	
2010-11	the	Taliban	returned	to	their	old	strongholds	in	central	Helmand.	The	
insurgents	gave	a	fiery	welcome	to	the	new	British	battalion	arriving	in	October	2010	
to	take	over	responsibility	for	Nad-e	Ali.	The	battalion	commander	recalls	‘a	literal	
baptism	of	fire’	with	‘36	prolonged	engagements’	in	the	first	three	days	‘including	a	
determined	Taliban	attack	on	the	District	Centre.’
21
	The	US	Marines	who	had	taken	
over	Sangin	district	from	the	British	that	winter	had	an	even	tougher	time	of	it.	One	
US	Marine	battalion	(the	3/5)	had	suffered	25%	casualties	by	December	2010,	mid-
way	through	its	seven-month	tour.
22
	
	
To	be	sure,	the	insurgents	also	suffered	losses.	One	survey	based	on	
interviews	conducted	with	Taliban	commanders	in	Helmand	in	2011-12	suggests	that	
the	Taliban	attrition	rate	across	the	province	that	previous	year	was	as	high	as	
                                                
20	
	Briefing	by	Commander	ISAF,	General	David	Petraeus,	ISAF	HQ,	Kabul,	9	October	2010	(Farrell	
attended).	
21	
	Lt	Col.	Colin	Weir,	‘Using	Air	Power	in	a	Small	War:	A	Battlegroup	Commander’s	Reflections	on	
Operations	in	Afghanistan	–	Winter	2010/11,’	Air	Power	Review,	vol.	16,	no.	1,	Spring	2013,	p.	112.	
22	
	Bing	West,	One	Million	Steps:	A	Marine	Platoon	at	War	(New	York:	Random	House,	2014),	p.129.	
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20%.
23
	Moreover,	the	intensity	of	ISAF	operations	greatly	retarded	the	Taliban’s	
effort	to	develop	shadow	government	in	the	province.	However,	as	might	be	
expected,	the	Taliban	adapted	to	ensure	the	vitality	of	their	military	campaign.	They	
took	measures	to	strength	strategic	command	and	control	of	the	insurgency	and	
improve	cooperation	between	Taliban	fighting	groups.	Military	commissioners	were	
appointed	for	provinces	and	districts	to	give	direction	to	and	adjudicate	between	
rival	field	commanders.
24
	The	Taliban	also	switched	tactics	from	what	were	pretty	
conventional	infantry	assaults	against	ISAF	and	Afghan	government	bases	from	2006	
to	2008,	to	the	more	usual	guerrilla	methods	of	sniping	and	roadside	bombs.	This	
shift	was	formalized	in	a	general	order	issued	by	the	Quetta	Shura	in	2010	to	all	field	
commanders.
25
	Alongside	it	came	a	centrally	imposed	training	regime,	supported	by	
mobile	training	teams	sent	in	from	Pakistan.
26
	This	past	decade	the	Taliban	have	also	
been	very	successful	in	undermining	tribal	opposition,	and	in	exploiting	local	
grievances	towards	abusive	power-holders	in	order	to	mobilise	support	for	their	
insurgency.
27	
	
	
	
                                                
23	
	Theo	Farrell	and	Antonio	Giustozzi,	‘The	Taliban	at	War:	Inside	the	Helmand	Insurgency,	2004-
2012,’	International	Affairs,	vol.	89,	no.	4,	July	2013,	p.	870.	This	paper	is	based	on	53	interviewees	
with	Taliban	over	2011-12,	conducted	by	Afghan	field	researchers	(journalists	by	training)	supervised	
by	Giustozzi.	28	Taliban	answered	questions	about	the	number	in	their	fighting	group	killed	in	action	
over	the	previous	year.	
24	
	Farrell	and	Giustozzi,	‘The	Taliban	at	War,’	pp.	856-862.	
25	
	This	was	confirmed	by	thirteen	Taliban	interviewees.	Farrell	and	Giustozzi,	‘The	Taliban	at	War,’	p.	
865.	
26	
	This	was	confirmed	by	five	Taliban	interviewees.	Farrell	and	Giustozzi,	‘The	Taliban	at	War,’	pp.	
865-6.	
27	
	Carter	Malkasian,	War	Comes	to	Garmser:	Thiry	Years	of	Conflict	on	the	Afghan	Frontier	(London:	
Hurst,	2013);	Mike	Martin,	An	Intimate	War:	An	Oral	History	of	the	Helmand	Conflict	(London:	Hurst,	
2014).	Martin	emphasizes	the	importance	of	local	sources	of	conflict	over	the	role	of	the	Taliban,	but	
equally	his	book	shows	how	the	Taliban	are	able	to	exploit	these	same	local	conflict	dynamics.	
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Impossible	victory	
If	the	Afghan	government	with	the	full	support	of	ISAF	forces	could	not	defeat	the	
Taliban,	what	chance	have	the	Afghan	security	forces	operating	on	their	own?	The	
answer	is	none,	of	course.	And	so	it	has	proven	to	be.		
The	first	key	test	for	the	Afghan	security	forces	was	actually	in	2013.	ISAF	
deliberately	adopted	a	far	more	backseat	role	in	the	2013	fighting	season	to	see	if	
Afghan	security	forces	could	plan	and	conduct	operations	by	themselves	(as	they	
would	have	to	when	ISAF	had	left).
28
	An	independent	assessment	in	2013	concluded	
that	‘the	Afghan	army	showed	that	it	can	fight	well’	and	that	the	Taliban	‘could	not	
tactically	overmatch	Afghanistan’s	soldiers.’
29
	To	be	sure,	the	report	noted	many	
challenges	ahead	for	Afghan	security	forces:	the	army	was	very	poor	at	logistics	and	
maintenance;	the	police	were	often	outgunned	by	insurgents;	the	air	force	was	
unable	to	provide	close	air	support;	and	the	security	ministries	in	Kabul	were	not	
good	at	planning	and	budgeting.	All	of	these	problems	remain	true	for	today.	
However,	the	report	concluded	that	the	Taliban	did	not	have	a	good	campaign	in	
2013:	
	
	[the]	insurgents	were	unable	to	seize	and	hold	large	swaths	of	
terrain;	they	were	unable	to	take	and	hold	district	centers	or	other	
notable	political	targets;	they	were	limited	in	their	ability	to	
influence	major	population	centers	(occasional	high-profile	attacks	
notwithstanding);	and	they	remain	generally	unpopular	among	the	
                                                
28	
	Farrell	discussions	with	ISAF	planners,	HQ	ISAF,	Kabul,	March	2013.	
29	
	Jonathan	Schroden,	Patricio	Asfura-Heim,	Catherine	Norman,	and	Jerry	Meyerle,	Were	the	Afghan	
National	Security	Forces	Successful	in	2013?	DOP-2014-U-006817-Final,	Center	for	Naval	Analysis,	
January	2014,	p.	3.	
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Afghan	populace.
30	
	
The	2014	fighting	season	did	not	go	quite	so	well	for	the	Afghan	National	
Defence	and	Security	Forces	(ANDSF),	who	were	even	more	on	their	own	as	NATO	
forces	increasingly	focused	on	the	logistically	demanding	job	of	pulling	out	of	
Afghanistan	and	closing	down	bases	across	the	country.
31
	In	the	south,	the	Taliban	
launched	large-scale	assaults	in	several	districts	in	Helmand	province.	In	late	
September,	the	Taliban	overran	Sangin	capturing	everything	except	the	district	
centre	and	central	bazaar;	it	was	six	months,	before	the	ANDSF	launched	a	counter-
offensive	supported	by	NATO	air	power	to	retake	some	lost	ground.	In	October,	the	
Taliban	attacked	the	provincial	capital,	Lashkar	Gah,	twice	with	massive	suicide	
bombs.	According	to	one	estimate,	the	ANDSF	suffered	close	to	1,300	killed	in	
Helmand	alone	between	August	and	December	2014,	which	amounted	to	almost	
25%	of	total	ANDSF	combat	losses	in	Afghanistan	for	2014.	Elsewhere	the	Taliban	
seized	villages	in	the	rural	provinces	of	Uruzgan	and	Ghazni,	and	the	provinces	of	
Wardak,	Kapisa	and	Logar	surrounding	Kabul.	This	enabled	insurgents	to	twice	
ambush	ANA	convoys	along	the	Kabul	to	Kandahar	highway	that	were	ferrying	
reinforcements	for	Sangin.	The	Taliban	also	made	major	gains	in	the	north.	In	August	
2014,	insurgent	forces	were	reported	to	be	just	five	kilometers	from	Kunduz,	the	
fifth	largest	city	in	Afghanistan.	By	January	2015	local	officials	admitted	that	the	
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	Schroden	et	al.,	Were	the	Afghan	National	Security	Forces	Successful	in	2013?	p.	11.	
31	
	At	the	height	of	US	force	levels	there	were	over	800	bases	in	Afghanistan.	By	early	2014,	this	
number	had	fallen	to	below	80	and	was	due	to	fall	to	27	by	October	2014.	See	Ian	S.	Livingston	and	
Michael	O’Hanlon,	Brookings:	Afghanistan	Index,	31	July	2015,	figure	1.26,	p.	15,	
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index/index20150731.pdf		
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Taliban	had	‘effectively	surrounded’	the	city.
32
	Reflecting	the	worsening	situation	
across	the	country,	civilian	fatalities	caused	directly	by	the	conflict	rose	from	under	
3,000	in	2013	to	over	3,600	in	2014.
33
	
The	United	States	had	planned	to	reduce	its	remaining	forces	in	Afghanistan	
from	9,800	down	to	5,500	by	the	end	of	2015.	This	plan	was	quietly	scrapped	in	the	
face	of	growing	concern	in	Washington	DC	about	the	ability	of	the	ANDSF	to	check	a	
Taliban	resurgence.	The	start	of	the	Taliban’s	2015	offensive,	officially	launched	on	
24	April,	saw	an	immediate	spike	in	armed	activity	with	a	45%	rise	in	insurgent	
initiated	attacks,	leading	to	a	33%	increase	in	ANDSF	casualties	in	the	month	that	
followed.
34
	This	year’s	offensive	has	seen	the	Taliban	make	gains	in	Helmand	and	
Uruzgan	in	the	south,	and	Kunduz,	Faryab,	and	Badakhshan	in	the	north.
35
	Over	
three	months	of	near-continuous	fighting	in	northeast	Uruzgan,	the	Taliban	
decimated	local	pro-government	militia	forces.	Here,	as	elsewhere,	abusive	behavior	
by	police	and	militia	(including	rape	of	children	and	murder	of	civilians),	turned	local	
communities	against	the	government	and	gave	the	Taliban	and	easy	in-road	to	the	
district.
36
	In	neighboring	Helmand,	the	Taliban	captured	two	districts,	Now	Zad	in	
late	July	and	Musa	Qala	in	late	August.	The	ANDSF	retook	Musa	Qala	four	days	later	
on	30	August,	following	a	major	battle	in	which	some	200	Taliban	were	reportedly	
killed.	However,	it	appears	that	the	ANA	left	after	only	one	day	and	the	Taliban	
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	Lauren	McNally	and	Paul	Bucala,	The	Taliban	Resurgent:	Threats	to	Afghanistan’s	Security,	
Afghanistan	Report	11,	The	Institute	for	the	Study	of	War,	March	2015,	pp.	13-17,	19-20.	
33	
	Livingston	and	O’Hanlon,	Brookings:	Afghanistan	Index,	31	July	2015,	figure	1.21,	p.	13.	
34	
	Special	Inspector	General	for	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	(SIGAR),	Quarterly	Report	to	the	United	
States	Congress,	30	July	2015,	pp.	93,	96.	
35	
	‘Season	of	Bloodshed”	The	Taliban	Are	Waging	a	Fierce	New	Offensive	in	the	North,’	The	
Economist,	30	May	2015,	http://www.economist.com/node/21652338/print		
36	
	Martine	van	Bijlert,	‘Trouble	in	Khas	Uruzgan:	Insults,	Assaults,	a	Siege	and	an	Airlift,’	Afghan	
Analysts	Network,	2	September	2015,	https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/trouble-in-khas-
uruzgan/		
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promptly	recaptured	the	district	centre.	The	district	centre	finally	returned	to	
government	control	when	the	Taliban	pulled	out	to	attack	neighbouring	Kajaki	
district.
37
	A	report	by	the	Afghan	Analysts	Network	in	September	2015	estimates	
that	of	the	14	districts	in	Helmand,	‘8	are	under	full	or	significant	Taliban	control.’
38
	
Elsewhere,	the	Taliban	launched	their	most	spectacular	attack	in	Kabul	in	June,	when	
a	massive	car	bomb	was	exploded	outside	the	fortified	Afghan	parliament	and	seven	
gunmen	attempted	to	storm	the	building;	the	attack	was	timed	to	coincided	with	
parliamentary	debate	over	Ghani’s	nominee	for	Minister	of	Defence,	Mohammad	
Masoon	Stanekzai.
39
	And	in	July,	the	Uzbek	warlord	and	Afghan	Vice	President,	
General	Dostum,	rushed	to	Faryab	to	mobilise	his	tribal	milita	to	prevent	a	large	
Taliban	force,	reported	to	be	up	to	5,000	strong,	from	overrunning	the	province.
40	
The	high	tempo	of	operations	has	predictably	put	great	strain	on	the	ANDSF.	
Official	U.S.	figures	point	to	attrition	in	Afghan	army	numbers	from	184,000	in	
February	2014	down	to	176,000	in	May	2015;	the	army	(including	Afghan	air	force)	is	
now	only	at	87%	of	its	approved	end-strength	of	203,000.	In	contrast,	Afghan	police	
numbers	have	risen	slightly	by	a	few	thousand	over	the	same	period	to	155,000	
(which	is	98%	of	their	approved	end-strength	of	157,000).
	41
	Underlying	these	
numbers	are	very	high	desertion	rates	in	the	ANA	and	very	high	casualty	rates	in	
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		 Correspondence	with	Carter	Malkasian,	26	October	2015.	
38	
	Thomas	Ruttig,	‘The	Second	Fall	of	Musa	Qala:	How	the	Taleban	Are	Expanding	Territorial	
Control,’	Afghan	Analysts	Network,	3	September	2015,	p.	3,	https://www.afghanistan-
analysts.org/the-second-fall-of-musa-qala-how-the-taleban-are-expanding-territorial-control/;	see	
also	Sune	Engel	Rasmussen,	‘Afghan	Forces	Retake	Musa	Qala	from	Taliban,’	The	Guardian,	30	August	
2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/30/afghan-forces-retake-musa-qala-from-
taliban		
39	
	Robin	Pagnamenta,	Tom	Coghlan,	and	Eltaf	Asefy,	‘Taliban	Takes	Terror	into	Afghanistan	
Parliament,’	The	Times,	23	June	2015,	
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/afghanistan/article4477191.ece			
40	
	Sune	Engel	Rasmussen,	‘Afghanistan’s	Warlord	Vice-President	Spoiling	for	a	Fight	with	the	
Taliban,’	The	Guardian,	4	August	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/04/afghan-
vice-president-militia-taliban-general-dostum		
41	
	SIGAR,	Quarterly	Report,	30	July	2015,	Table	3.6,	p.	98.	
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particular	in	the	ANP.
42
	Indeed,	concerns	about	the	ability	of	the	Afghan	National	
Police	to	cope	with	the	insurgency	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Afghan	Local	Police	
(ALP)	in	2010,	these	being	officially	sanctioned	and	armed	local	militias	that	are	
reported	to	now	number	some	28,000.
43
	
The	Afghan	army	numbers	would	be	more	worrying	and	police	numbers	
more	reassuring	if	we	could	have	confidence	in	the	reliability	of	these	figures.	
However,	we	cannot.	The	U.S.	Special	Inspector	General	on	Afghanistan	
Reconstruction	is	blunt	about	this	problem:	‘Neither	the	US	nor	Afghan	government,	
however,	really	knows	how	many	Afghan	security	forces	actually	exist.	There	are	
widespread	cases	of	“ghost	soldiers”	who	do	not	exist	and	whose	pay	is	simply	
embezzled.’
44
	The	same	is	true	for	statistics	on	security	force	attrition	rates	and	
insurgent	initiated-attacks,	which	are	now	dependent	on	ANDSF	‘operational	
reporting’	where	previously	they	were	compiled	by	ISAF.
45
	This	complicates	the	task	
of	assessing	the	progress	in	the	conflict.	
However,	there	is	enough	evidence	to	show	that	neither	side	is	going	to	be	
victorious.	The	Taliban	do	appear	to	have	gained	ground	in	2014	and	2015,	but	there	
is	no	way	that	they	can	ever	defeat	the	ANDSF;	the	Afghan	army,	in	particular,	is	
simply	too	large	and	too	capable.	As	we	discussed,	the	Taliban	took	a	handful	of	
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		 Joseph	Goldstein,	‘Afghan	Security	Forces	Struggle	Just	to	Maintain	Stalemate,’	New	York	Times,	
22	July	2015.	
43	
	Proponents	see	ALP	as	offering	a	way	for	tribal	mobilizing	to	resist	Taliban	encroachment	while	
critics	see	ALP	as	officially	sanctioned	warlord	militias	whose	abusive	behavior	turns	local	
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the	Afghan	Local	Police,	Asia	Report	No.	268,	4	June	2015.	
44	
	Project	for	the	Study	of	the	21st	Century,	Rebuilding	Afghanistan–Transparency	and	Oversight	in	
America’s	Longest	War,	27	July	2015,	http://projects21.com/2015/07/27/ps21-report-rebuilding-
afghanistan-transparency-and-oversight-in-americas-longest-war/		
45	
	In	its	latest	quarterly	report	to	the	Congress,	the	U.S.	Department	of	Defense	expressed	the	
problem	in	polite	terms:	‘Due	to	the	different	collection	and	input	methods,	the	data’s	quality	differs	
than	during	previous	years	when	Afghan	forces	were	typically	partnered	with	coalition	forces.’	U.S.	
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district	centers	but	they	did	not	hold	them	for	long	–	with	the	exception	of	districts	
in	northern	Helmand	where	they	have	strong	support	from	local	tribal	groups	and	
drug	lords.	Even	here,	the	Afghan	army	was	able	to	eject	the	Taliban	from	Musa	Qala	
town	at	great	cost	to	the	insurgents;	the	problem	was	that	the	army	did	not	stick	
around	to	defend	the	district	centre.		
The	fall	of	Kunduz	illustrated	more	fault	lines	in	the	National	Unity	
Government	than	the	fragility	of	the	ANDSF.	The	National	Unity	Government	was	
formed	precisely	one	year	before	the	Taliban	captured	Kunduz,	following	a	bitterly	
contested	presidential	election	between	Ghani	and	his	main	rival	Abdullah	Abdullah.	
Following	US	intervention,	it	was	agreed	that	Abdullah	Abdullah	would	be	appointed	
Chief	Executive	Officer,	as	a	sort	of	prime	minister	role	to	President	Ghani.	Most	
accounts	suggest	that	the	two	men	get	along	but	their	respective	camps	do	not.	This	
rivalry	was	played	out	in	Kunduz	with	the	provincial	governor,	a	Pashtun	appointed	
by	Ghani,	at	loggerheads	with	the	deputy	provincial	governor	and	provincial	police	
chief,	both	Tajiks	appointed	by	Abdullah	Abdullah.
46
	The	provincial	governor	was	
unable	to	reign	in	abuse	by	ALP	who	are	protected	by	the	provincial	police	chief.	
Thus,	attempts	to	clear	surrounding	districts	of	Taliban	became	opportunities	for	ALP	
to	go	on	‘a	looting	rampage’	and,	much	like	Uruzgan,	this	made	it	easy	for	the	
Taliban	to	consolidate	their	hold	over	such	areas.
47
	The	population	in	Kunduz	also	
grew	increasingly	disillusioned	by	ineffective	and	corrupt	provincial	government.	
Unusual	in	provinces	in	the	north,	Kunduz	has	a	sizeable	Pashtun	population.	Indeed,	
the	city	can	be	thought	of	as	an	Afghan	‘Londonderry’	–	i.e.,	analogous	to	the	most	
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47	
	Lola	Cecchinel,	‘The	End	of	a	Police	Chief:	Factional	Rivalries	and	Pre-election	Power	Struggles	in	
Kunduz,’	Afghan	Analysts	Network,	31	January	2014.	
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divided	city	in	Northern	Ireland	–	without	the	security	walls	dividing	the	cityscape.	
The	Taliban	operation	shrewdly	exploited	this	ethnic	geography.	For	their	infiltration,	
they	sought	help	from	naqileen	(i.e.,	migrant	Pashtun	communities)	in	the	city	and	
surrounding	villages.	Many	residents	cooperated	with	Taliban	infiltrating	the	city	in	
advance	of	the	offensive.	As	the	New	York	Times	reported,	‘even	pro-government	
residents	and	Afghan	security	officials	now	admit	that	part	of	the	assault	on	Kunduz	
started	from	within	the	city:	Many	of	the	Taliban	fighters	had	been	hiding	in	people’s	
homes	before	they	launched	an	inside-out	offensive.’
48
		
To	be	sure,	there	were	ANDSF	failings	in	the	defence	of	Kunduz,	in	particular,	
the	lack	of	coordination	between	the	ANA	and	the	Afghan	Civil	Order	Police	in	
separate	garrisons	on	either	side	of	the	city,	as	well	as	the	failure	to	anticipate	a	new	
style	of	Taliban	urban	warfare.	Hopefully	Kunduz	will	serve	as	a	wake-up	call	for	the	
ANDSF	to	improve	coordination,	although	this	is	dependent	on	whether	rivalries	
within	the	National	Unity	Government	are	replicated	in	provincial	appointments.	
Regardless,	Kunduz	shows	that	even	if	the	Taliban	can,	with	extraordinary	effort	and	
some	good	fortune,	seize	a	provincial	centre,	they	cannot	hold	it	–	just	as	they	
cannot	stop	the	ANA	from	recapturing	district	centres.	They	have	also	been	unable	
to	replicate	the	success	of	Kunduz	elsewhere.	In	the	weeks	following	Kunduz,	Taliban	
massed	thousands	of	fighters	in	attempts	to	overrun	on	the	provincial	capitals	of	
Faryab	and	Ghazni;	in	both	cases	the	Taliban	assaults	were	repulsed	by	ANDSF.
49
	The	
Taliban	are	also	unable	to	decapitate	Afghan	government	through	terrorist	attacks	in	
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7	October	2015.	
49
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Guardian,	13	October	2015.	
 16 
Kabul.	Thus,	both	sides	are	locked	in	a	military	stalemate	with	no	prospect	for	this	to	
change	in	the	foreseeable	future.	This	conflict	is	not	going	to	be	settled	by	force.		
	
Talks	Take	Off	
When	Ashraf	Ghani	was	inaugurated	as	President	of	Afghanistan	in	September	2014,	
he	clearly	identified	achieving	peace	as	his	top	priority.
50
	Karzai	had	made	a	
rhetorical	commitment	to	pursuing	an	accommodation	with	the	Taliban,	although	he	
lacked	a	coherent	strategy	to	back	up	this	commitment.	The	new	president	brought	
a	fresh	strategic	approach	to	the	challenge	of	peace-making.	The	motivation	for	
prioritising	peace	was	economic	and	compelling.	Ghani	appreciated	that	there	was	
no	plausible	scenario	in	which	the	Afghan	state	could	attain	fiscal	sustainability	while	
being	locked	into	the	level	of	security	expenditure	that	he	inherited.
51
	Ghani	also	
rethought	the	mechanism	for	pursuing	peace	in	what	amounted	to	a	strategic	
gambit.	
	
Ghani’s	gambit	
Ghani	calculated	that	Pakistani	support	to	the	Afghan	Taliban	was	critical	to	the	
movement's	successful	insurgency	campaign.	He	thus	set	himself	the	challenge	of	
bringing	an	end	to	Pakistan's	proxy	warfare	in	Afghanistan.	He	engaged	in	détente	
with	the	Pakistan	military,	by	symbolically	visiting	their	headquarters,	promoting	
frequent	top-level	meetings	between	the	Afghan	and	Pakistani	military	and	
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intelligence	chiefs	and	offering	to	conduct	security	operations	against	Pakistani	
Taliban	who	attacked	Pakistan	across	the	frontier.	The	quid	pro	quo	Ghani	
demanded	of	the	Pakistan	military	was	that	they	use	their	influence	on	the	Afghan	
Taliban,	to	bring	them	to	the	negotiating	table,	and	thus	kick-start	a	process	that	
might	generate	a	ceasefire	and	political	agreement.
52	
	 Through	his	series	of	détente	moves	Ghani	hoped	to	incentivise	the	Pakistan	
army	to	end	support	to	the	Taliban	military’s	campaign	and	further	to	oblige	the	
Taliban	to	enter	peace	talks.	Ghani	spoke	openly	of	the	need	to	bring	an	end	to	
Pakistan’s	proxy	warfare	in	Afghanistan.	At	the	same	time,	he	recognised	that	the	
Pakistan	military's	support	for	proxies	was	part	of	a	broader	regional	strategy	of	
confrontation	with	India	and	was	not	explicitly	driven	by	an	imperative	to	dominate	
or	destabilise	Afghanistan.	The	Ghani	calculation	thus	factors	in	the	notion	that	the	
Taliban	will	decide	whether	to	talk	based	on	their	assessment	of	the	prospects	of	the	
military	campaign,	but	essentially	relies	on	the	Pakistan	army	persuading	them	that	
they	cannot	sustain	that	campaign
53
.		
	 The	new	Afghan	strategic	approach	envisaged	talks	and	ultimately	a	political	
agreement	with	the	Taliban.	But	the	tools	which	the	government	applied	in	trying	to	
orchestrate	the	talks	primarily	related	to	Afghanistan-Pakistan	relations	and	had	
little	to	do	with	placating	or	wooing	the	Taliban.	Soon	after	the	Afghan	Presidential	
visit	to	Pakistan	the	military	leadership	gave	an	undertaking	to	Ghani	that	they	
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would	indeed	prevail	upon	the	Taliban	to	attend	direct	talks.
	54
	Much	of	
reconciliation-related	activity	in	2015	revolved	around	that	undertaking.	In	February,	
the	Taliban	leadership	was	reported	as	having	received	a	request	from	the	Pakistan	
military	to	clarify	their	position	on	whether	they	would	attend	talks.	The	Taliban	
convened	a	leadership	shura	meeting	to	discuss	the	issue	but	avoided	giving	a	clear	
response.	Instead,	the	acting	leader,	Akhtar	Mohammad	Mansoor,	was	reported	as	
having	referred	the	matter	to	supreme	leader,	Mullah	Omar,	and	he	deferred	the	
decision	pending	receipt	of	a	response.
55	
	 While	the	Taliban	delayed	their	response	to	the	demand	for	them	to	enter	
peace	talks,	they	went	ahead	with	announcing	their	2015	‘spring	offensive’,	in	line	
with	the	pattern	of	previous	years.	Although	the	Taliban	had	sustained	some	military	
momentum	during	the	winter	period,	as	we	noted,	the	announcement	was	followed	
both	by	a	discernible	increase	in	the	tempo	of	attacks	across	the	country	and	several	
high	profile	attacks	in	the	Kabul	area.	The	deferred	Taliban	response	to	pressure	for	
talks	and	the	escalating	violence	obliged	the	Afghan	government	team	to	address	
the	issue	of	deadlines.	The	Afghan	President	had	let	it	be	known	at	the	outset	that	
his	strategy	included	a	deadline	by	which	he	expected	Taliban	to	move	towards	talks	
but	he	avoided	publicising	when	exactly	that	deadline	would	expire.	However,	
Ghani’s	public	statements	in	spring	2015	indicated	that	he	was	hopeful	of	starting	a	
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political	process	early	enough	in	the	year	to	avert	the	customary	increase	in	
violence.
56
	The	launch	of	the	Taliban	offensive	put	an	end	to	this	hope.	
	 Ghani	understandably	maintained	ambiguity	on	the	deadline	for	his	the	onset	
of	talks,	while	letting	the	Pakistan	military	and	all	others	concerned	know	that	the	
nascent	process	was	threatened	by	the	escalating	violence.	By	early	summer	it	
seemed	that	the	Afghan	government’s	position	that	both	sides	cease	or	at	least	
reduce	fighting	while	entering	talks	had	shifted	to	accepting	that	the	fighting	season	
would	follow	its	normal	course	even	if	talks	got	underway.
57	
	
Talks	in	China	and	Pakistan	
A	month	after	the	Taliban's	announcement	of	their	offensive,	Ghani’s	gambit	
seemed	to	generate	its	first	tangible	output.	Kabul	announced	that	government	
representatives	had	met	with	Taliban	envoys	in	Urumqi,	China,	in	a	meeting	hosted	
by	the	Chinese	authorities	and	facilitated	by	the	Pakistan	Army.	The	discussions	were	
preliminary	and	so	Afghan	officials	did	not	claim	any	substantive	progress.	Rather,	
they	emphasised	that	the	significance	of	the	Urumqi	meeting	lay	in	the	fact	that	the	
Taliban	had	agreed	to	meet	face-to-face	with	government	representatives.	
Moreover	the	meeting	was	described	as	unofficial,	and	so	neither	side	delivered	a	
formal	negotiating	position.
58
	But	even	this	apparent	step	forward	prompted	efforts	
by	the	Afghan	government	and	allies	to	determine	the	standing	of	the	Taliban	
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delegation	to	Urumqi,	which	was	headed	by	former	Interior	Minister	Abdul	Razaq	
Achakzai.	Achakzai	was	known	to	be	a	member	of	the	Taliban	Leadership	Council.	
However,	the	Afghan	government	was	unable	to	confirm	that	he	had	a	clear	
mandate	from	the	rest	of	the	Taliban	leadership	to	attend.	Indeed,	shortly	
afterwards	the	Taliban	official	spokesman	issued	a	statement	rejecting	that	the	
meeting	had	even	taken	place.
59
	The	combination	of	the	doubtful	status	of	the	
Taliban	delegation,	plus	the	lack	of	any	substantive	engagement,	meant	that	Ghani	
concluded	that	he	had	still	not	achieved	his	minimal	objective	of	drawing	the	Taliban	
into	direct	talks.	
	 The	next	result	of	the	Kabul	strategic	initiative	came	in	June,	when	the	Kabul	
and	Pakistan	governments	announced	that	they	finally	had	succeeded	in	holding	
official	face-to-face	talks	between	the	Taliban	and	Afghan	government	
representatives	in	a	cantonment	in	the	Pakistani	hill	resort	of	Murree.	This	time	
official	observers	from	the	United	States	and	China	were	present,	signifying	high-
level	international	political	blessing	for	the	process.	The	Afghan	government	
delegation	was	this	time	led	by	a	deputy	foreign	minister	and	senior	member	of	the	
High	Peace	Council	and	included	members	deliberately	chosen	to	be	representative	
of	the	multiple	political	tendencies	present	in	the	National	Unity	Government.	The	
composition	of	both	delegations	indicated	a	certain	seriousness	of	engagement.	As	
one	analyst	noted,	‘[t]hose	Taleban	who	participated	in	the	four-hours	Murree	talks	
included	figures	of	such	seniority	and	authority	that	no	room	was	left	but	to	
conclude	the	meeting	had	been	endorsed,	at	least	tacitly,	by	the	movement’s	
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leadership.’
60
	However	after	the	conclusion	of	the	meeting,	participants	provided	
conflicting	accounts	of	the	tenor	of	discussions,	ranging	from	suggestions	that	the	
Taliban	seemed	to	be	ready	to	discuss	a	ceasefire,	to	claims	that	the	Taliban	
provocatively	said	they	were	only	interested	in	receiving	the	government's	
surrender.	Communiques	from	the	Pakistan	hosts	and	the	visiting	Afghans	concurred	
that	the	main	outcome	was	an	agreement	to	meet	again.
61
	
	 Despite	the	significant	investment	of	diplomatic	capital	made	in	the	Murree	
meeting	by	all	four	countries	involved,	doubts	concerning	the	extent	to	which	the	
engagement	was	formally	authorised	by	the	Taliban	leadership	recurred.	These	
doubts	were	reinforced	by	the	Taliban's	official	communications,	on	the	website	
controlled	by	their	Cultural	Commission.	In	the	wake	of	the	Murree	meeting	this	
website	carried	ambiguous	statements	endorsing	the	principle	of	political	contacts	in	
pursuit	of	peace	but	claiming	that	the	authorised	body	within	the	movement	to	
conduct	such	contacts	was	the	Political	Commission’s	office	based	in	Doha,	Qatar.	
These	announcements	implied	that	the	Taliban	delegation	in	Murree	may	not	have	
been	competent	to	represent	the	movement.	One	interpretation	is	that	distrustful	of	
Pakistan,	the	Taliban	Political	Commission	were	opposed	to	the	Murree	talks.	
Nonetheless,	under	pressure	from	Pakistan,	Mansoor	‘gave	a	green	light’	for	them	to	
go	ahead	on	condition	that	they	stayed	secret.	When	the	talks	were	made	public	by	
the	Afghan	and	Pakistan	governments	this	strengthened	the	position	of	those	in	the	
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Political	Commission	who	argued	that	it	is	they	who	should	manage	any	future	talks,	
far	from	Pakistan	interference.
62
		
	
The	Pakistan	conundrum	
Ghani	offered	the	opportunity	for	Afghanistan	to	re-set	its	relations	with	Pakistan.	
Karzai	believed	that	it	was	impossible	for	Afghanistan	to	have	‘healthy	relations’	with	
Pakistan.	For	him,	the	series	of	trilateral	meetings	between	him	and	Pakistan	
President	Asif	Ali	Zardari,	chaired	by	British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron,	were	a	
charade.	At	the	third	round	of	talks,	held	in	February	2013,	the	two	parties	agreed	to	
‘take	all	necessary	measures	to	achieve	the	goal	of	a	peace	settlement	over	the	next	
six	months’,	with	the	clear	inference	that	Pakistan	would	lean	on	the	Taliban	to	enter	
into	such	talks.	For	Karzai,	this	preposterous	goal	spoke	volumes	about	Pakistan	
sincerity.
63
	
	 Pakistan’s	support	to	the	Afghan	Taliban	followed	a	strategic	logic	–	as	a	
bullwak	against	perceived	growing	Indian	influence	in	Afghanistan	–	and	just	
importantly,	it	made	sense	politically;	Pakistan	public	opinion	unquestionably	sided	
with	the	Afghan	Taliban	in	their	armed	struggle	against	the	foreign	invaders.
64
	
Ghani’s	gambit	was	therefore	based	on	the	assumption	that	Pakistan’s	calculations	
had	changed.	The	growing	assertiveness	of	the	Tehrik-i-Taliban	Pakistan	(TTP)	had	
prompted	a	major	offensive	by	the	Pakistan	Army	against	their	strongholds	in	North	
Warziristan	over	the	summer	of	2014.	In	retaliation,	the	TTP	attacked	a	Pakistan	
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Army	school	in	Peshawar	in	December,	murdering	145	children.
65
	Whilst	the	Afghan	
Taliban	and	TTP	are	completely	different,	Pashtun	militancy	in	the	border	areas	had	
grown	to	such	an	extent	as	to	present	a	threat	to	the	Pakistan	state	and	to	alarm	
public	opinion.	Ghani’s	view,	therefore,	was	that	Pakistan	now	had	good	reason	to	
cooperate	in	ending	the	conflict	in	Afghanistan	in	order	to	improve	security	in	
Pashtun	areas	on	both	sides	of	the	border.
66
	
	 Pakistan	leverage	over	the	Afghan	Taliban	is	central	to	Ghani’s	gambit	
because	the	strategy	relies	upon	persuading	the	Pakistan	Army	to	oblige	the	Taliban	
to	come	to	the	negotiating	table	and	ultimately	to	end	their	military	campaign.	It	is	
also	the	factor	that	is	most	misunderstood	and,	arguably,	which	is	inherently	
unknowable.	The	Taliban	leadership	is	acutely	aware	that	its	military	campaign	is	
dependent	upon	retaining	access	to	Pakistan	territory.	In	effect	the	geography	of	the	
Taliban's	insurgency	straddles	the	Pakistan-Afghanistan	frontier.	However	analysts	
have	struggled	to	describe	the	relationship	between	the	Taliban	and	the	Pakistan	
state	convincingly.	One	tendency	within	the	Afghan	security	establishment	has	
talked	up	the	extent	of	state	support	to	the	Taliban,	in	effect	describing	the	Taliban	
as	being	so	dependent	upon	Pakistan	army	support	as	to	have	no	capacity	for	
autonomous	decision-making.
67
	Analysts	more	sympathetic	to	the	Pakistan	army	
stress	that	its	interaction	with	the	Taliban	is	limited	and	leverage	is	minimal.
68
	Even	if	
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the	reality	is	somewhere	between	these	positions,	so	that	Taliban	are	autonomous	
actors	but	obliged	to	observe	a	set	of	red	lines,	the	underlying	relationship	between	
the	Taliban	and	their	hosts	is	inherently	covert.		
	 This	poses	major	challenges	for	a	strategy	based	upon	persuading	Pakistan	to	
apply	leverage	on	the	Taliban,	given	that	there	is	no	agreement	among	the	parties	
involved	over	the	extent	of	the	leverage,	nor	any	means	for	them	to	monitor	it.	The	
Taliban	received	significant	military	support	from	Pakistan	in	its	war	against	the	
Afghan	state,	and	there	is	evidence	that	the	Pakistan	Army	continues	to	back	the	
Taliban.
69
	Critics	note	the	irony	that	the	United	States	was	giving	hundreds	of	
millions	of	dollars	in	military	aid	to	a	state	that	has	been	engaged	in	a	proxy	war	
against	US	forces.
70
	Against	this,	there	is	deep	resentment	among	the	Taliban	
leadership	towards	Pakistan,	both	for	how	Pakistan	bowed	to	US	pressure	following	
9/11	(and	handed	over	some	Taliban	to	the	Americans	to	be	rendered	to	
Guantanamo
71
),	and	for	continued	Pakistan	interference	since	then	in	Taliban	affairs.	
	 The	formal	opening	of	the	Taliban	office	in	Qatar	in	2013	was	an	attempt	by	
the	Taliban	to	escape	Pakistan	control.	It	was	met	with	Pakistan	displeasure:	the	
brothers	of	Tayeb	Agha,	the	then	Head	of	the	Taliban	Political	Commission,	were	
picked	up	by	the	Pakistan	Inter-services	Intelligence	agency	(ISI)	and	held	in	gaol	for	
a	number	of	months.
72
	This	episode	reveals	something	of	the	methods	by	which	the	
ISI	exert	pressure	on	the	Taliban	leadership.	In	response	to	this	kind	of	harassment,	a	
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number	of	Taliban	leaders	have	relocated	with	their	families	to	Iran	and	the	Gulf.	
This	suggests	that	while	Pakistan	may	be	able	to	exercise	some	control	over	the	
Taliban	through	such	crude	means,	it	may	not	have	much	positive	influence;	put	
another	way,	as	the	Murree	talks	suggest,	Pakistan	may	be	able	to	get	the	Taliban	to	
come	to	the	negotiating	table,	but	this	is	not	to	say	that	they	can	get	the	Taliban	to	
negotiate.	
	
Taliban	Politics	
Ultimately,	the	success	of	any	peace	negotiations	will	depend	on	the	Taliban	wanting	
to	make	peace.	Any	effort	to	influence	this	process	faces	the	immensely	challenging	
task	of	understanding	Taliban	intentions	and	decision-making.	The	Taliban	
Movement	has	organized	itself	as	the	‘Islamic	Emirate	of	Afghanistan’,	constituted	of	
formal	structures	with	functional	commissions	at	national,	regional,	provincial	and	
district	level.	Embedded	within	these	formal	structures	are	various	informal	
networks,	such	as	the	‘Haqqani	Network’	led	by	Serajuddin	Haqqani.	Serajuddin	has	
extended	the	influence	of	his	network	across	half	of	the	country,	even	though	the	
rest	of	the	Emirate	leadership	does	not	formally	acknowledge	its	existence.	Likewise,	
commanders	in	the	southwest	with	a	tribal	support	base,	such	as	Baz	Mohammed	
and	Mansoor	Dadaullah	are	able	to	exert	more	influence	than	recognized	in	their	
formal	Emirate	positions.	This	complicates	any	attempt	to	discern	‘what	the	Taliban	
want.’
73
	Nonetheless,	as	we	discuss,	the	Taliban	has	a	powerful	hierarchical	doctrine	
that	serves	to	contain	the	ever-present	risk	of	organizational	fragmentation.	This	
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doctrine	is	inimical	to	power-sharing,	which	would	necessarily	form	the	heart	of	any	
sustainable	peace.	At	the	same	time,	it	means	that	the	Taliban	leadership	would	
likely	be	able	to	deliver	on	a	peace	deal.	
	
The	Emirate	after	Omar	
The	revelation,	in	July	2015,	that	the	movement's	deputy	had,	for	over	two	years,	
covered	up	the	death	of	the	original	leader,	both	triggered	a	succession	crisis	and	
provided	new	insights	into	Taliban	internal	politics.	During	the	period	from	early	
2013	to	July	2015	Mullah	Omar's	deputy,	Akhtar	Mohammad	Mansoor,	had	the	
consent	of	the	movement's	two	top	religious	scholars,	plus	a	handful	of	members	of	
the	leadership	council,	plus	two	male	relatives	of	Mullah	Omar,	to	keep	the	ameer's	
death	secret	and	to	continue	to	invoke	his	authority	while	running	the	movement.
74
	
The	movement's	cultural	wing	was	able	to	produce	multiple	declarations	
mendaciously	attributed	to	Mullah	Omar,	to	justify	leadership	decisions.	The	cover-
up	demonstrated	the	Taliban's	ability	to	act	clandestinely	and	for	the	top	leadership	
to	engage	in	deception,	not	just	of	their	rivals	but	of	all	those	in	the	movement	who	
did	not	belong	to	the	ruling	clique.	It	is	significant	that	the	period	of	the	Mullah	
Omar	cover-up	coincided	with	key	developments	in	the	putative	peace	process,	
including	the	attempt	to	open	an	office	in	Qatar	in	2013,	and	the	launch	of	talks	in	
China	and	Pakistan	in	2015.	Mansoor’s	hand	is	likely	behind	these	tentative	efforts	at	
shifting	from	a	Taliban	strategy	of	fighting	to	one	of	‘fight	and	talk.’	Taliban	
adherence	to	the	doctrine	of	leadership	obedience	would	have	facilitated	such	a	
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development,	by	enabling	Mansoor	to	rule	for	the	ameer	while	provoking	little	
debate	or	dissent.
75
		
	 The	first	serious	dissent	within	the	Taliban	leadership	occurred	in	the	wake	of	
the	revelation	of	Mullah	Omar's	death,	with	a	group	of	veterans	challenging	the	
legitimacy	of	Mansoor’s	elevation	to	the	position	of	ameer.	The	movement	was	split	
but	unevenly	so,	with	all	the	national	structures	and	most	of	the	military	
commanders	declaring	loyalty	to	Mansoor	as	new	ameer,	while	his	challengers	could	
demonstrate	little	mass	support.	This	demonstrated	a	sense	of	common	purpose	
within	the	movement	was	sufficient	that	its	cohesiveness	survived	and	loyalty	was	
transferred	to	a	new	leader,	despite	the	record	of	deception.	Mansoor’s	success	in	
consolidating	himself	as	ameer	suggests	that	the	Taliban	leadership	will	continue	to	
practise	deception	and	dissimulation	in	their	conduct	of	the	‘fight	and	talk’	strategy,	
and	that	the	Taliban	movement	will	continue	to	behave	as	an	integrated	
organisation,	whether	pursuing	the	fighting	or	the	talking	components	of	this	
strategy.	
	 The	culture	and	politics	of	the	Taliban	movement	indicate	that	its	military	
commanders	constitute	the	most	important	internal	constituency.	The	movement	
has	a	long	tradition	of	blurring	the	distinction	between	civil	and	military,	as	positions	
such	as	provincial	governor	embrace	both	military	and	civilian	responsibilities.	
However	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	a	large	cadre	of	military	commanders	who	are	
directly	responsible	for	leading	the	insurgency	in	Afghanistan.	Although	the	doctrine	
of	leadership	obedience	dictates	that	the	field	commanders	submit	to	the	authority	
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of	the	movement’s	Pakistan-based	leadership,	in	reality	the	leadership	feels	
compelled	to	strive	constantly	to	maintain	the	loyalty	of	the	field	commanders.	This	
was	illustrated	during	the	succession	struggle	where	Mansoor’s	success	in	
consolidating	himself	depended	critically	on	the	relations	he	had	developed	in	the	
military	during	his	period	as	deputy.	The	fact	that	the	military	is	powerful	within	the	
Taliban	does	not	in	itself	preclude	a	settlement.	Rather	it	dictates	that	the	leadership	
patronise	the	military.	Hitherto	the	simplest	way	it	has	found	to	do	this	is	to	sustain	
the	armed	campaign,	which	provides	a	pretext	for	channeling	resources	to	the	
military.	The	leadership	is	also	aware	that	it	is	vulnerable	to	accusations	of	‘selling	
out’	and	alienating	the	military	if	it	were	to	pursue	political	engagement	without	
taking	them	into	confidence.	
	 The	central	Taliban	political	concept,	that	of	an	Islamic	Emirate,	and	the	way	
that	it	has	been	realised	after	2001,	helps	to	shape	leadership	decision-making	on	
issues	of	talking	versus	fighting.	Western	commentators	have	referred	to	the	Taliban	
‘shadow	administration.’	However,	for	supporters	of	the	Taliban	Movement,	the	
Islamic	Emirate	is	not	‘shadow’	but	real.	The	provincial	and	district	level	governors	
appointed	by	the	Taliban,	the	judiciary,	and	the	twelve	national	commissions	
(including	the	Military,	Political,	Financial	and	Cultural	Commissions),	constitute	an	
alternative	administration.	In	areas	where	the	Taliban	exert	significant	influence,	the	
population	is	able	to	approach	the	Taliban	for	resolution	of	civil	and	criminal	cases.
76
	
Indeed,	when	describing	their	system,	Taliban	frequently	claim	that	the	civilian	
population	more	readily	approaches	Taliban	officials	than	government	appointed	
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	Antonio	Giustozzi	and	Adam	Baczko,	‘The	Politics	of	the	Taliban’s	Shadow	Judiciary,’	Central	Asian	
Affairs,	vol.	1	(2014),	199-224.	
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judges	or	administrators.
77
	The	Taliban's	provincial	and	district	commissions,	acting	
under	the	authority	of	the	Finance	Commission,	collect	revenue	to	defray	the	
expenses	of	maintaining	the	Taliban	establishment	and	contribute	to	the	armed	
campaign.	Among	supporters	of	the	Taliban	movement,	including	at	least	some	of	
the	civilian	population	in	the	areas	where	they	exert	influence,	the	legitimacy	of	
Taliban	officials	is	on	a	par	with	that	of	government	appointees.	Thus,	as	far	as	the	
Taliban	is	concerned,	their	Islamic	Emirate	already	constitutes	a	Shariat-based	
system	(that	is,	political	system	ruled	by	Koranic	law)	and	they	are	incrementally	
extending	its	control	across	Afghanistan	initially	mainly	in	the	rural	areas.	The	idea	of	
the	Islamic	Emirate	as	a	work	in	progress	means	that	the	Taliban	leadership	do	not	
have	to	consider	victory	as	a	binary	variable,	tied	for	example	to	the	capture	of	the	
capital.	Thus,	their	inability	to	take	Kabul	does	not	mean	that	the	Taliban	has	to	
consider	their	campaign	unsuccessful.	Indeed,	they	take	pains	to	show	off	how	their	
Islamic	Emirate	is	already	a	functioning	reality,	even	without	the	badges	of	
sovereignty.	
	 The	Taliban	idea	of	Islamic	Emirate	has	other	implications	for	leadership	
strategic	decision-making.	The	essence	of	the	emirate	lies	in	the	role	of	the	supreme	
leader.	According	to	Taliban	dogma,	it	is	the	existence	of	a	single	divinely	guided	
leader	which	guarantees	that	the	movement	will	serve	the	interest	of	Islam.	When	
the	Taliban	last	controlled	Afghanistan	they	nested	the	Emirate	within	state	
structures,	so	that	Mullah	Omar	retained	his	assumed	Islamic	title	of	ameer	ul	
momineen,	but	exercised	most	of	the	constitutional	functions	of	the	head	of	state,	
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according	to	established	Afghanistan	practice.	Likewise	one	of	the	most	constant	
themes	in	Taliban	political	practice	has	been	insistence	on	the	idea	of	the	ameer's	
authority	being	absolute,	indivisible	and	fundamental.	During	the	1990's,	in	their	
dealings	with	armed	opposition,	the	one	non-negotiable	demand	of	the	Taliban	was	
that	the	opposition	submit	to	the	authority	of	the	ameer.	More	recently,	in	the	
Taliban	internal	politics	of	the	leadership	succession,	Akhtar	Mohammad	Mansoor’s	
fundamental	demand	of	dissidents	and	challengers	was	that	they	accept	him	as	
ameer,	as	the	price	for	him	being	prepared	to	consider	any	other	concession	or	
compromise.		
	
Taliban	Doctrine	and	Pragmatism	
It	is	hard	to	see	a	sustainable	peace	deal	that	does	not	involve	some	kind	of	power-
sharing	arrangement	with	the	Taliban.	Afghans	are	well	familiar	with	power-sharing	
compromises,	whether	from	the	coalitions	of	the	differing	mujahideen	parties	in	the	
mid-1990s	or	the	current	National	Unity	Government.	However,	such	arrangements	
sit	uneasily	with	the	Taliban’s	doctrine	of	the	supreme	ameer.	Moreover,	political	
coalitions	have	tended	to	fracture	and	fail	in	Afghanistan.	In	this	sense,	the	National	
Unity	Government	is	following	a	well-worn	path.	Thus	the	inherent	doctrinal	and	
pragmatic	unattractiveness	of	coalition	may	make	continuing	with	the	military	
campaign	the	most	attractive	strategy,	allowing	Taliban	at	least	to	retain	their	
incremental	Emirate.		
	 At	the	same	time,	there	is	a	more	pragmatic	strain	in	Taliban	thinking	that	is	
unsatisfied	with	the	Emirate	as	it	stands,	and	understands	the	need	for	compromise	
if	the	Taliban	is	to	return	to	government.	This	view	recognises	that	the	limitations	of	
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Taliban	political	power,	as	much	as	military	power,	make	a	solely	Taliban	national	
government	unsustainable.	The	Taliban	recognize,	in	particular,	that	much	has	
changed	in	terms	of	public	attitudes	towards	then.	As	one	Taliban	leader	noted	in	
October	2014:		
	
The	High	Commission	[Quetta	Shura]	doesn’t	have	any	strategies	or	
plans	in	order	to	take	over	Kabul	once	again	as	they	believe	that	a	
lot	of	changes	have	taken	place	in	the	past	12	years	which	has	
resulted	in	people	no	longer	having	the	same	opinion	about	the	
Taliban	movement	and	it	will	make	it	harder	for	people	to	accept	
the	Taliban.
78	
	
It	is	further	evident	from	discussions	with	senior	Taliban	figures	that	they	have	
thought	about	the	practicalities	of	how	power-sharing	might	work,	including	the	
division	of	cabinet	posts.
79
	This	more	pragmatic	view	is	to	be	found,	in	particular,	
within	the	Taliban’s	Political	Commission.	Senior	leaders	within	the	Political	
Commission	eagerly	anticipated	the	onset	of	peace	talks	following	Ghani’s	
inauguration.
80
	Indeed,	it	appears	that	informal	talks	occurred	between	Ghani	and	a	
representative	of	the	Political	Commission	in	2014.
81	
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	Interview	with	Taliban	military	leader	no.	10.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	researcher	
supervised	by	Semple.	The	interviewee	went	to	disagree	with	the	Quetta	Shura’s	view	on	this.	
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	Discussions	with	former	Taliban	minister	and	former	Taliban	deputy	minister,	Gulf,	July	2012.	
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	Interview	with	Taliban	political	leader	no.	2,	Dubai,	August	2014.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	
researcher	supervised	by	Semple.	
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	Interview	with	Taliban	political	leader	no.	1,	Dubai,	August	2014.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	
researcher	supervised	by	Semple.	
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	 It	is	not	clear	how	much	sway	these	more	pragmatic	ideas	hold	with	the	
Taliban’s	core	leadership	in	the	Quetta	Shura.	As	we	noted,	the	Quetta	Shura	must	
be	attentive	to	the	views	of	the	military	base.	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	many	Taliban	
field	commanders	are	suspicious	of	Taliban	diplomats	in	the	Political	Commission.	
One	senior	Taliban	military	figure	observed	in	October	2014	that	‘[a]t	the	moment,	
the	political	group	is	against	war	and	specially	in	present	and	they	want	Taliban	to	
participate	in	one	of	the	peace	making	processes.	Whereas,	the	military	group	are	
against	the	political	group	and	think	that	the	only	way	to	progress	is	through	
fighting.
82
	Another	senior	Taliban	leader	told	us	that	‘a	lot	of	military	commanders	
believe	that	there	is	no	difference	between	the	Afghan	government	and	members	of	
the	Taliban	Political	Commission.’
83
	A	different	Taliban	leader	took	a	more	balanced	
view,	recognising	that	there	were	differences	of	opinion	among	military	
commanders	–	some	think	that	the	Political	Commission	misrepresent	the	Taliban	
and	distract	it	from	fighting,	while	others	recognize	the	virtue	of	the	Political	
Commission	in	developing	‘very	good	relation[s]	with	the	international	
community.’
84	
	 The	Taliban	doctrine	of	obedience	to	the	leader	has	more	practical	
implications	in	that	it	has	been	a	key	factor	in	protecting	the	movement	from	
fragmentation.	The	Taliban	Movement	was	unique	among	major	Afghan	political-
military	forces	in	that	it	survived	two	decades	without	experiencing	any	significant	
split.	Furthermore	there	is	a	recognisable	command	chain	stretching	from	the	
                                                
82	
	Interview	with	Taliban	military	leader	no.	6.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	researcher	
supervised	by	Semple.		
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	Interview	with	Taliban	military	leader	no.	17.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	researcher	
supervised	by	Semple.	
84	
	Interview	with	Taliban	military	leader	no.	12.	Interview	undertaken	by	Afghan	researcher	
supervised	by	Semple.	
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Pakistan-based	leadership	to	each	district	of	Afghanistan.
85
	The	movement's	
cohesiveness	both	defines	the	way	it	makes	war	and	suggests	how	it	could	make	
peace.	The	fact	that	the	Taliban	have	a	cohesive	national	structure	means	that	it	is	
meaningful	to	talk	of	a	national	level	military	campaign,	with	coherent	objectives	
and	a	strategy,	on	a	scale	which	represents	a	credible	threat	to	the	Afghan	state.	The	
fact	that	there	is	an	empowered	leadership	means	that	potentially,	should	that	
leadership	decide	to	shift	to	a	strategy	that	places	more	emphasis	on	peace	talks,	it	
could	credibly	represent	the	whole	of	the	movement	and,	with	due	efforts	to	
maintain	the	confidence	of	the	military,	even	move	towards	a	ceasefire.	In	short,	the	
Taliban	leadership	could	make	good	on	a	peace	agreement.	
	 At	the	same	time,	the	Taliban	leadership	are	concerned	about	the	risks	of	
fragmentation	from	entering	peace	talks.	An	important	complicating	factor	here	is	
the	Taliban’s	ties	to	various	other	jihadi	groups,	and	most	importantly	to	Al	Qaeda.	
During	the	Taliban	diplomatic	initiative	through	its	Political	Commission	in	Qatar,	the	
movement's	representatives	have	generally	stressed	that	the	Taliban's	political	
objectives	are	restricted	to	Afghanistan.	As	part	of	the	agreement	allowing	for	the	
opening	of	a	Taliban	mission,	the	movement	gave	a	statement	stating	that	it	would	
not	allow	Afghan	soil	to	be	used	for	attacks	on	other	countries.
86
	However,	the	
Taliban	military	meanwhile	have	developed	their	cooperation	with	the	range	of	
militant	groups,	relying	upon	them	for	military	expertise	and	claiming	responsibility	
for	military	operations	or	terrorist	attacks	which	they	have	undertaken.	The	links	
                                                
85	
	This	is	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	Farrell	and	Giustozzi,	‘The	Taliban	at	War,’	pp.	855-861.	
86
	In	private	discussions	with	us,	senior	Taliban	leaders	stated	that	the	movement	would	be	prepared	
to	renounce	Al	Qaeda	as	part	of	a	future	peace	deal.	See	Semple	et	al,	‘Taliban	Perspectives	on	
Reconciliation,’	p.	3.	
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between	the	Haqqani	family	and	Al	Qaeda	are	especially	deep.
87
	In	the	spirit	of	
openness	in	communications	which	the	Taliban	adopted	during	the	succession	
struggle,	their	official	media	organs	acknowledged	the	oath	of	loyalty	which	
Zawahiri,	head	of	Al	Qaeda,	took	to	the	new	Taliban	ameer.	The	extensive	Taliban	
links	with	international	jihadi	allies	impinges	on	strategic	decision	making	because	
these	groups	are	inimically	opposed	to	any	settlement	in	Afghanistan	short	of	a	
Taliban	victory.	Any	Taliban	move	towards	substantive	talks	would	risk	alienating	the	
movement's	allies	and	potentially	pushing	them	into	open	opposition.	
	 A	further	complicating	factor	is	the	emergence	of	Islamic	State	(IS)	in	
Afghanistan.	The	UN	mission	in	Afghanistan	reports	IS	as	being	present	most	
provinces	in	Afghanistan,	but	it	has	‘dominant	presence’	in	only	one,	Nangarhar,	and	
most	of	these	IS	fighters	are	in	fact	‘rebranded’	TTP	from	Pakistan.
88
	The	main	
difference	between	the	IS-Taliban	relationship	and	that	between	the	Taliban	and	Al	
Qaeda	and	affiliates	is	that	IS	has	directly	challenged	the	Taliban's	claim	to	
leadership	of	the	jihad	in	Afghanistan.	The	Taliban	has	responded	to	that	challenge	
by	publicly	warning	IS	that	it	is	undermining	jihadi	unity	and	by	launching	concerted	
attacks	on	groups	affiliated	to	the	organisation	wherever	they	emerge	in	
Afghanistan.
89
	The	number	of	fighters	pledged	to	IS	in	Afghanistan	is	a	fraction	of	
those	affiliated	with	the	Islamic	Emirate.	Nevertheless,	the	Taliban	have	started	to	
factor	IS	into	their	strategic	decision-making,	as	witnessed	by	the	Taliban	campaign	
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against	them.	Faced	with	a	prospect	of	entering	substantive	talks	and	a	peace	
process,	the	Taliban	leadership	would	be	concerned	with	the	risk	of	fighters,	who	
disagreed	with	the	process,	defecting	to	IS.	
	
A	new	strategy:	influence	and	hedge	
Writing	in	Foreign	Affairs	in	June	2015,	Afghan	experts	James	Dobbins	and	Carter	
Malkasian	made	the	case	for	peace	talks.	The	alternative,	they	argue,	is	‘a	long	war	
of	attrition	that	would	ravage	the	country,	upend	regional	stability,	and	strain	the	
budgets	of	the	United	States	and	its	allies.’	We	agree	completely.	Our	analysis	of	the	
war	supports	the	view	that	neither	the	Taliban	nor	the	Afghan	government	is	
capable	of	outright	military	victory.	Providing	the	Washington	perspective,	Dobbins	
and	Carter	outlined	‘five	concrete	steps’	that	the	United	States	should	take	‘to	keep	
the	negotiations	moving	forward.’	These	are	to	continue	to	provide	financial	and	
military	support	to	the	Afghan	government,	to	work	behind	the	scenes	to	strength	
the	National	Unity	Government,	to	put	pressure	on	Pakistan	to	get	the	Taliban	to	
negotiate,	to	be	prepared	to	accept	the	compromises	that	will	be	necessary	for	
peace	(including	changes	to	the	Afghan	constitution),	and	to	keep	a	sizeable	force	in	
Afghanistan	until	the	deal	is	done	and	dusted.
90
	These	all	seem	sensible	steps	to	us.		
	 Our	article	complements	Dobbins	and	Carter	by	exploring	the	Taliban	
perspective	on	peace	talks.	Our	research	into	Taliban	ideas	on	the	conflict	shows	
that	there	is	at	least	some	support	within	the	movement	for	an	end	to	the	fighting	
based	on	an	Afghan	political	compromise.	However,	despite	at	least	four	years	of	
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concerted	efforts	to	draw	the	Taliban	leadership	into	a	negotiated	settlement,	the	
Taliban	movement	continued	to	prioritise	fighting	over	talking,	and	so	escalated	
their	armed	campaign.	Any	political	strategy	to	end	the	armed	conflict	should	be	
based	upon	a	clear	understanding	of	why	the	reality	of	a	military	stalemate	in	the	
war	did	not	generate	impetus	towards	a	settlement.	
	 The	factors	which	prompt	the	Taliban	to	fight	on	include	the	imperfect	
information	available	to	Taliban	strategic	decision-makers,	the	intrinsic	contextual	
uncertainty	on	key	issues	such	as	durability	of	US	support	to	Kabul,	a	political	
economy	within	the	movement	favouring	fighters	over	diplomats,	and	an	inherent	
Taliban	tendency	to	take	an	optimistic	view	of	their	military	achievements	and	
capability.	An	ingrained	political	culture	of	tactical	and	strategic	deception	
compounds	the	issues	of	imperfect	information	and	uncertainty.	The	epitome	of	this	
was	the	Taliban's	success	in	maintaining	the	fiction	of	Mullah	Omar	being	in	charge	
for	over	two	years.	The	result	is	that	the	Taliban	leadership	is	both	chronically	
suspicious	of	the	real	intentions	of	other	actors	and	confident	of	its	own	ability	to	
deceive	its	opponents.	
	 The	dominant	theory	holds	that	a	conflict	will	be	‘ripe’	for	the	onset	of	peace	
talks	when	both	sides	are	locked	in	a	‘mutually	hurting	stalemate.’
91
	However,	when	
one	side	has	military	momentum	–	as	ISAF	had	in	2009-2011	and	the	Taliban	have	
now	–	the	temptation	is	to	fight	on	in	the	misplaced	hope	of	victory.	Moreover,	such	
momentum	gives	added	voice	to	those	in	the	movement	opposed	to	peace	talks.	
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	 Up	to	now,	international	efforts	to	generate	movement	towards	a	negotiated	
settlement	in	Afghanistan	have	been	characterised	by	dependence	on	a	single	main	
line	of	action,	with	little	effort	to	integrate	that	with	supporting	actions.	In	a	
situation	of	imperfect	information	and	uncertainty,	this	may	be	precisely	the	wrong	
approach.	For	four	years	from	2011	to	2014,	international	effort	towards	an	Afghan	
peace	settlement	focused	on	trying	to	start	negotiations	through	the	movement's	
Political	Commission	in	Qatar.	This	track	was	essentially	superseded	in	2015	by	
international	encouragement	of	the	Afghanistan-Pakistan	détente	and	promise	of	
Pakistan	leverage	bringing	the	Taliban	into	negotiations.		
	 An	alternative	approach	to	pursuit	of	a	negotiated	settlement,	which	takes	
into	account	the	inherent	difficulties	of	interpreting	the	Taliban	response,	would	be	
to	‘influence	and	hedge’.		Such	an	approach	would	involve	multiple	lines	of	action	
designed	both	individually	and	cumulatively	to	increase	the	chance	of	the	Taliban	
embracing	a	settlement.	This	is	required	because	poor	information	means	that	it	is	
impossible	to	calibrate	the	amount	of	pressure	delivered	by	any	single	line	of	action.	
The	prime	example	of	this	is	the	current	main	line	of	action,	the	Afghan-Pak	détente,	
which	depends	upon	the	Pakistan	army	applying	leverage	to	the	Taliban.	In	reality,	
little	can	be	known	about	how	much	leverage	is	applied	or	how	successful	a	
determined	Taliban	leadership	is	at	withstanding	that	leverage.	Thus,	supporting	
lines	of	action	can	try	to	influence	Taliban	towards	negotiations,	in	case	the	main	line	
of	action	is	not	in	itself	sufficient.		
	 The	hedge	component	is	based	on	the	notion	that,	even	if	multiple	tools	are	
used	to	orchestrate	a	settlement,	it	still	may	be	unattainable.	Hedging	actions	are	
required	to	secure	the	next	best	alternative.	In	the	absence	of	a	settlement	between	
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a	united	Taliban	movement	and	the	Afghan	government,	the	next	best	alternative	is	
likely	to	be	a	reduction	in	the	intensity	of	the	insurgency,	with	some	parts	of	the	
Taliban	movement	renouncing	the	armed	campaign.	A	strategy	of	‘influence-and-
hedge’	would	create	opportunities	for	the	preferred	outcome	of	a	comprehensive	
settlement	and	discrete	end	to	violence,	while	ensuring	that	if	that	proves	
unattainable,	at	least	the	government	should	not	face	an	intensified	armed	
campaign	waged	by	a	united	movement.	
	 The	range	of	actions	available	for	the	influence	side	of	the	strategy	starts	
with	the	initiative	prioritised	by	Ghani,	namely,	international	support	for	Pakistan's	
attempt	to	leverage	the	Taliban	into	negotiations.	As	Dobbins	and	Carter	highlight,	
Washington	has	an	important	role	to	play.	Following	Kunduz,	the	Obama	
administration	has	decided	to	5,600	troops	in	Afghanistan	beyond	2016.
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	The	
Taliban	have	consistently	maintained	that	all	foreign	troops	must	be	out	of	
Afghanistan	before	a	peace	deal	can	be	reached.	However,	private	discussions	with	
senior	Taliban	pragmatists	reveal	that	some	within	the	movement	understand	that	
they	will	have	to	accept	a	long-term	US	military	presence.
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	Thus	the	size	and	profile	
of	the	US	military	force	in	Afghanistan	provides	key	leverage	in	future	peace	talks	
with	the	Taliban.	It	would	be	most	unhelpful	for	the	United	States	to	give	away	this	
bargaining	chip	before	the	talks	have	been	concluded.	
	 Complementary	actions	could	include	dialogue,	fomenting	of	debate,	social	
mobilisation	and	orchestration,	all	calibrated	to	influence	the	Taliban	leadership	
towards	negotiating	an	end	to	the	fighting.	Dialogue,	outside	of	the	main	negotiating	
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track,	would	seek	to	build	the	leadership's	confidence	in	the	possibility	of	settlement	
and	challenge	the	assumptions	underlying	the	decision	to	fight	on	i.e.	it	seeks	to	
address	information	and	uncertainty.	Approached	in	this	way,	interaction	with	the	
Taliban's	Political	Commission	in	Qatar	and	low	profile	contacts	with	members	of	the	
leadership	can	be	complementary	to	rather	than	compete	with	a	main	negotiating	
track	through	Pakistan.	Opportunities	to	foment	Taliban	internal	debate	could	
include	work	with	Taliban	prisoners	who	are	stakeholders	in	progress	towards	a	
settlement,	and	are	well	networked	with	their	comrades	outside	of	jail.	Social	
mobilisation	opportunities	draw	upon	the	dependence	of	the	Taliban	on	key	non-
Taliban	Afghan	constituencies,	most	notably	Afghan	refugee	communities	and	
traders	in	Pakistan,	pro-jihadi	ulema	and	communities	in	Afghanistan	where	the	
Taliban	operate.	These	constituencies	too	have	some	capacity	to	leverage	the	
Taliban	leadership	towards	settlement.	Finally	orchestration	involves	influencing	
Taliban	internal	politics	in	favour	of	those	members	of	the	leadership	supportive	of	
peace	talks.	The	state	actors	involved,	principally	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan,	have	
some	experience	of	this	form	of	orchestration	and	the	succession	struggle	within	the	
Taliban	provided	a	classic	example	of	an	orchestration	opportunity,	if	it	had	been	a	
priority	for	either	state.	There	have	of	course	been	attempts	to	influence	the	Taliban	
over	the	years.	The	point	of	placing	them	within	an	influence-and-hedge	strategy	
would	be	to	be	to	ensure	a	coordinated	approach,	pushing	towards	an	agreed	effect.	
	 Hedging	seeks	to	harness	the	potential	of	Taliban	to	reduce	violence,	even	in	
the	absence	of	a	comprehensive	settlement.	Some	hedging	actions	are	based	on	
significantly	different	assumptions	from	the	influencing	actions.	For	example,	those	
pursuing	negotiations	depend	upon	Taliban	maintaining	the	movement's	
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cohesiveness,	to	ensure	that	the	movement	can	deliver	on	a	deal.	But	in	the	absence	
of	a	deal,	a	break	down	of	cohesiveness	may	reduce	the	movement's	capacity	to	
deliver	violence	and	open	the	way	for	constituencies	within	the	movement	to	
support	a	ceasefire.	Examples	of	the	kind	of	hedging	actions	possible	include	a	
reinvigorated	counter-narrative	to	challenge	Taliban	claims	to	be	waging	a	legitimate	
jihad.	‘Strategic	reintegration’	is	the	term	used	for	deals	to	rehabilitate	senior	
figures.	Such	reintegration	deals	should	be	designed	to	boost	the	prestige	of	the	
senior	Taliban	who	have	ceased	fighting	and	enable	them	to	dispense	patronage	and	
build	support	within	the	movement.		
	 Based	on	the	idea	that	hedging	should	challenge	the	Taliban	leadership's	
attempt	to	integrate	the	movement	nationally,	there	are	opportunities	to	pursue	
local	de-escalation	of	the	conflict,	by	addressing	grievances	and	alienation	that	have	
driven	specific	fighter	networks	into	the	insurgency.	Remarkably	little	effort	has	
been	put	into	this	-	the	Sangin	Peace	Accord	in	2011	being	a	rare	example.
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day	workshop	we	held	in	Dubai	with	senior	Taliban	and	Afghan	government	figures	
in	early	2013	found	that	there	were	unexploited	possibilities	for	declared	local	
ceasefires,	and	that	this	could	be	designed	around	joint	Taliban-Afghan	district	
security	commissions	to	monitor	adherence	to	ceasefire	agreements.
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reason	they	ought	to	be	supported	in	the	context	of	a	larger	effort	to	negotiate	an	
end	to	the	conflict.	
	 Influencing	and	hedging	should	be	located	them	in	the	same	strategy,	and	
pursued	simultaneously	and	synergistically,	rather	than	waiting	for	the	outcome	of	
efforts	at	negotiation	before	deciding	whether	other	efforts	are	also	necessary.	In	
the	opaque	world	of	Afghan	insurgency	an	influence-and-hedge	approach	tries	to	
reduce	violence	even	without	full	knowledge	of	how	the	Taliban	will	pursue	their	
campaign.	Such	an	approach	may	offer	less	certainty	than	is	comfortable	for	
policymakers,	but	it	is	more	realistic	and	likely	to	succeed.	
